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NOTES
Common Sense: Rethinking the New
Common Rule's Weak Protections for
Human Subjects
Since 1991, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, known as the "Common Rule," has protected the identifiable
private information of human subjects who participate in federally
funded research initiatives. Although the research landscape has
drasticallychanged since 1991, the Common Rule has remained mostly
unchanged since its promulgation. In an effort to modernize the
Common Rule, the Federal Policy for the Protectionof Human Subjects
FinalRule ("FinalRule') was published on January19, 2017. The Final
Rule, however, decreases human-subjectprotections by increasingaccess
to identifiable data with limited administrativeoversight. Accordingly,
the Final Rule demands reconsideration. This Note conducts a
comparative analysis of the Final Rule and the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information ("Privacy Rule').
Ultimately, this Note argues that a revised Final Rule should
incorporatea modified version of the Privacy Rule that in turn provides
human subjects with legally enforceable rights, remedies, and control
over how information about them is used.
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The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.
-The Nuremberg Code'

INTRODUCTION

In his 2015 State of the Union address, former president Barack
Obama announced the Precision Medicine Initiative ("PMI"), an
interagency program that relies on patient-powered research to
accelerate biomedical discoveries. 2 Precision medicine is defined as
treatment and prevention tailored to the individual, 3 with
consideration of the "variability in genes, environment, and lifestyle for

2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
1.
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181 (1949).

2.
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 20, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarkspresident-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [https://perma.cc/X8AM-24AZ].
3.
The
Precision
Medicine
Initiative,
OBAMA
WHITE
HOUSE,
2018)
5,
Aug.
visited
(last
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/node/333101
[https://perma.cc/ZUT7-7EKJI ("[M]ost medical treatments have been designed for the 'average
patient.' As a result of this 'one-size-fits-all' approach, treatments can be very successful for
some patients but not for others.").
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each person." 4 In theory, precision medicine enables clinicians and
researchers to better understand the complex structure underlying a
patient's condition and more accurately predict which health strategies
will be most effective.
Precision medicine's effectiveness depends on the availability of
data-more data increases the likelihood of accurate results and
accelerates scientific discoveries. Following PMI's 2016 launch, the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH") received $130 million "to build a
national, large-scale research participant group." 5 To achieve this goal,
NIH launched the All of Us Research Program ("All of Us"), which aims
to gather data from "one million or more people living in the United
States." 6 All of Us began beta testing in June 2017, and national
enrollment launched on May 6, 2018.7

All of Us, and precision medicine generally, highlights a
significant shift toward a participatory research model where human
subjects "increasingly expect to be partners in research." 8 Although
accelerating the speed and volume of data collection is a win for science,
this model necessitates greater protections for human subjects. Human
subjects demand "greater choice over how their information is used"
and require privacy and security over the identifiable private

4.
Nat'l Insts. of Health, What Is Precision Medicine?, GENETIcS HOME REFERENCE,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/precisionmedicine/definition
(last visited
Aug.
5,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/HHH7-T7BW].
5.
About
the
All
of
Us
Research
Program, NAT'L
INSTS.
HEALTH,
https://allofus.nih.gov/about/about-all-us-research-program
(last visited June
15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/UY2V-DDUJ]; NIH Announces National Enrollment Date for All of Us Research
Program to Advance Precision Medicine, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (May 1, 2018),
https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/nih-announces-national-enrollment-date-all-usresearch-program-advance-precision-medicine
[https://perma.cc/L3YB-ZDAZ].
Forty-five
thousand participants enrolled in All of Us during the beta phase. Heather Landi, NIH's All of Us
Program Hits Milestone with National Enrollment to Launch May 6, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS
(May 1, 2018), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/population-health/nih-s-all-usprogram-hits-milestone-national-enrollment-launch-may-6 [https://perma.cc/6H9E-8X3S].
6.
About, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, https://allofus.nih.gov/about (last visited Sept. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/M9AD-T96H].
7.
Beta Testing Begins for NIH's All of Us Research Program,NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (June 5,
2017),
https://allofus.nih.gov/news-events-and-medialannouncements/beta-testing-begins-nihsall-us-research-program [https://perma.cclP7TG-YKAQ].
8.
See Kathy L. Hudson & Francis S. Collins, Bringing the Common Rule into the 21st
Century, 373 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2293, 2293 (2015) (emphasis added).

1706

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1703

information they volunteer. 9 When trust is broken, research comes to a

halt. 10
Promulgated in 1991, the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, known as the "Common Rule," protected human
subjects' identifiable private information, and it remained mostly
unchanged for roughly a quarter century." Recognizing the need to
modernize the Common Rule, sixteen federal departments and
agencies 12 published the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects Final Rule ("Final Rule") on January 19, 2017, after much
analysis and vetting.13 The Final Rule, however, does not strengthen
human-subject protections: the regulation reduces administrative
oversight, fails to adopt privacy standards, and broadens the scope of
participants' consent.
The Final Rule does not safeguard human subjects' interests and
information and accordingly demands reconsideration. By contrast, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA")
14
HIPAA's
provides an example of a participant-centric approach.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information
("Privacy Rule") not only limits the use and disclosure of protected

9.
KATHY HUDSON ET AL., PRECISION MED. INITIATIVE WORKING GRP., THE PRECISION
MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT PROGRAM - BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR 21ST CENTURY

MEDICINE 81 (2015), https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi[hereinafter PRECISION
working-group-report-20150917-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L97Y-7XVN]
MEDICINE INITIATIVE].

&

10. See id. at 3 (explaining that "maintaining trust is a critical component to a successful,
ongoing, and collaborative relationship").
11. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2017). The Common Rule was
promulgated in 1991 and amended in 2005. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). The Common
Rule has not been amended since 2005. Id.
12. As listed in the Federal Register, the sixteen federal departments and agencies are as
follows: Department of Homeland Security; Department of Agriculture; Department of Energy;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Department of Commerce; Social Security
Administration; Agency for International Development; Department of Housing and Urban
Development; Department of Labor; Department of Defense; Department of Education;
Department of Veterans Affairs; Environmental Protection Agency; Department of Health
Human Services ("HHS"); National Science Foundation; and Department of Transportation.
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7149. This Note cites to the
HHS provisions in the Code of Federal Regulations at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.
13. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7152. The sixteen
departments and agencies announced an Interim Final Rule that delays the effective and general
compliance date of the Final Rule by six months to July 19, 2018. See Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects: Delay of the Revisions to the Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects, 83 Fed. Reg. 2885, 2885 (Jan. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). The
delay is intended to provide regulated entities additional time to prepare to implement the Final
Rule. See id.
14. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
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health information ("PHI") but also provides rights and remedies to
human subjects. 15 In essence, where the Final Rule underregulates, the
Privacy Rule overregulates.
This Note comparatively analyzes the Final Rule and Privacy
Rule, positing a revised regulation that strengthens human-subject
protections with legal force. Part I provides an overview of the original
Common Rule and changes in the research landscape. Part II analyzes
the text of the Final Rule in light of public comments on proposed
changes to the Common Rule then considers the legal and ethical
consequences of the Final Rule. Part III compares the Privacy Rule and
the Final Rule to illustrate their differences and complexities. Finally,
Part IV reimagines the Final Rule as a protective regulation-rather
than a compilation of administrative requirements-that affords
human subjects legally enforceable rights, remedies, and control over
how information about them is used.
I. COMMON COURTESY: AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN-SUBJECT
PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Human subjects, quite literally the subjects of research, are
living individuals about whom a researcher obtains "data through ...
identifiable private information." 16 Identifiable private information is
private information from which the human subject's identity "may
readily be ascertained by the investigator or associated with the
information."1 7 A human subject provides this information for "a
specific purpose" with a reasonable expectation that the information
"will not be made public."1 8
In 1979, the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research published the Belmont
Report, which identified three ethical principles underlying humansubject research. 19 Respect for persons acknowledges human subjects'
autonomy and requires consent as a prerequisite to research.20
Beneficence obliges researchers to maximize benefits to society while
minimizing risks of harm to human subjects. 21 Justice demands
15.
16.
17.
18.

HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2017); see infraPart III.
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f).
Id.
Id.

19
NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4-6 (1979), https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sites/default/files/the-

belmont-report-508cFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF8C-LRPQ [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 5.
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fairness in balancing the benefits conferred and burdens imposed
through research. 22 Even with modern advances in research and
technology, these ethical principles remain valid. The Belmont Report
influenced both the original Common Rule 23 and the new Final Rule. 2 4
Despite their ethical foundations, both rules fail to adequately
protect human subjects' identifiable private information. The Common
Rule was a "very clunky policy instrument." 25 The Final Rule, though
more refined, decreases protections as a result of increased access to
identifiable private information. 26 This Part details changes in the
research regulatory regime from the Common Rule (1991) to the Final
Rule (2017).
A. The Common Rule
Promulgated in 1991, the Common Rule aimed to "promote
uniformity, understanding, and compliance with human subject
protections." 2 7 Fifteen federal departments and agencies codified the
Common Rule in different regulations using identical language. 28 The
regulation covered all human-subject research "conducted, supported or
otherwise subject to regulation" by any federal department or agency
that codified the rule. 2 9

The Common Rule provided two critical protections to human
subjects: (1) Institutional Review Board ("IRB") requirements and (2)
informed consent requirements. 30 This Section provides a brief
overview of these two protections.

22. Id.
23. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects ('Common Rule'), U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/commonrule/index.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9GZL-D9LA] [hereinafter Common
Rule].
24. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7151 (Jan.
19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) ("The changes that are being implemented in the final
rule continue to be shaped by those principles . . . .").
25. Jocelyn Kaiser, U.S. Abandons Controversial Consent Proposal on Using Human
Research Samples, Scl. MAG. (Jan. 18, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/01/
update-us-abandons-controversial-consent-proposal-using-human-research-samples
[https://perma.cc/F4FR-WQ2L] (quoting Kathy Hudson, former NIH official).
26. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7202, 7209, 7213.
27. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,935 (Sept.
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
28. The Department of Labor, a signatory to the Final Rule, did not adopt the Common Rule.
Common Rule, supra note 23.
29. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2017).
30. Id. §§ 46.107-.117.
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1. IRB Requirements
The IRB is an administrative body comprising diverse members
established to protect human subjects' interests. 31 The Common Rule
granted the IRB authority to approve, modify, or disapprove research
activities subject to regulation. 32 Before research could take place, the
IRB ensured that the research plan satisfied seven requirements,
including adequate informed consent documents and sufficient
protocols for monitoring, collecting, and storing human-subject data. 33
The IRB also determined whether privacy measures were "adequate
with respect to the informational risks of the study." 34 If the study was
not approved by the IRB, it could not proceed.35
The Common Rule provided the IRB with three written
procedural requirements. 36 First, the IRB conducted both initial and
continuing review of research and reported its findings to the
researchers and their respective institutions. 37 Next, the IRB
determined which research activities "require[d] review more often
than annually" and which activities "need[ed] verification ... that no
material changes [had] occurred since previous IRB review."3 8 Finally,.
the IRB ensured that researchers reported proposed changes to studies
that were already approved. 39
The IRB reviewed research, and satisfied the requirements
above, through either convened or expedited review. 40 Research subject
to a convened review required approval from a majority of IRB

31. See id. §§ 46.107-.115. IRB diversity promotes respect for its advice in protecting human
subjects. Id. § 46.107(a) (listing IRB membership requirements).
32. Id. § 46.109(a). "Research subject to regulation, and similar terms are intended to
encompass those research activities for which a federal department or agency has specific
responsibility for regulating as a research activity (for example, Investigational New Drug
requirements administered by the Food and Drug Administration)." Id. § 46.102(e).
33. Id. § 46.111(a)(4)-(6).
34. Id. § 46.111(a)(7); see Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg.
53,933, 53,978 (Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
35. See OHRP Expedited Review Categories (1998), U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/categories-of-research-expeditedreview-procedure-1998/index.html (last visited June 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EN2R-FLTF].
Researchers and their institutions cannot override IRB decisions. Id.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(4).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513 (July
26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164).
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members. 4 1 Expedited review was available for "certain kinds of
research involving no more than minimal risk and for minor changes in
approved research." 42 Under an expedited review, the IRB chairperson
or another experienced member conducted the review and could
approve or modify, but not disapprove, the research. 43 Research could
only be disapproved in accordance with the Common Rule's
nonexpedited procedures for IRB review. 44
2. Informed Consent
Informed consent is a voluntary agreement to participate in
research4 5 and requires that researchers provide "sufficient
opportunity" for human subjects to decide without "coercion or undue
influence" whether to participate. 46 Under the Common Rule, unless
the human subject gave "legally effective informed consent,"
47
researchers could not conduct research on the human subject.
Common Rule compliance required informed consent protocols
to meet eight basic elements.48 Of relevance, researchers needed to
provide human subjects with a statement explaining the research,
including the purpose, procedures, and expected duration.49
Researchers analyzing identifiable data from a completed study for
another purpose usually needed to obtain additional informed consent
and additional IRB approval.5 0 Next, the Common Rule required a

41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(b); see Convened IRB Review, JOHNS HOPKINS MED.,
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/institutionalreview-board/guidelines-policies/guidelines/conv
enedreview.html (last visited June 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/XB4C-9TTW]. At least one member
must have primary concerns in a nonscientific area. 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(b).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110. Under the Common Rule, minimal risks meant "the probability and
magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests." Id. § 46.102(i). The secretary of HHS publishes (and can
amend with consultation) a list of categories of research that qualify for expedited review. Id.
§ 46.103(b)(4); see OHRP Expedited Review Categories (1998), supra note 35.
43. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110.
44. Id. Nonexpedited review procedures are set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(b).
45. Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship:InstitutionalReview Boards 297 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 95, 2005) ("[R]esearchers must get
permission not only from the IRB but also from the persons they study.").
46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116. Although the Common Rule does not define coercion or undue
influence, the Belmont Report provides helpful context. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 19, at
7. Coercion is "an overt threat of harm" to obtain compliance; undue influence is an improper
award to obtain compliance. Id.
47. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
48. Id. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8).
49. Id. § 46.116(a)(1).
50. See Hamburger, supra note 45, at 298-99. If the already collected data are de-identified,
the Common Rule does not govern their secondary use. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4).
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statement describing how researchers would maintain the human
subjects' identifiable private information, if applicable. 51 Finally,
researchers were required to provide a statement that human-subject
participation was voluntary and that "refusal to participate [would]
involve no penalty or loss of benefits." 52
Regardless of the IRB review type, basic informed consent
requirements were mandatory. 53 The IRB could, however, waive or
alter informed consent requirements for specific studies.5 4 Waiving or
altering was appropriate when the IRB determined that the following
conditions were present: (1) there was minimal risk5 5 of harm to human
subjects; (2) the waiver did not negatively affect human subjects; (3)
research could not be carried out without the waiver; and (4) additional
information would be provided to human subjects after participation. 56
B. An Impetus for Change
In a 2015 town hall meeting, Jerry Menikoff, Director of the
Office for Human Research Protections ("OHRP'), stated: "The way we
do research has changed . .. [but] most portions of the [Common] Rule

have not changed a great deal in many, many decades."5 7 As a result of
this stagnation, the Common Rule inadequately protected human
subjects' interests and information. Further, researchers faced
administrative burdens when applying Common Rule provisions in a
modern research environment. This Section discusses the factors
necessitating updates to human-subject protections by examining
regulatory problems, discrepancies in judicial enforcement, and recent
ethical controversies in research.

51. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5).
52. Id. § 46.116(a)(8). Human subjects can withdraw informed consent at any time for any
reason. See id.
53. See OHRP Expedited Review Categories (1998), supra note 35 (explaining that informed
consent requirements, waivers, alterations, or exceptions apply whether there is convened IRB
review or expedited IRB review).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d).
55. Id. § 46.393(d) ("Minimal risk is the probability and magnitude of physical or
psychological harm that is normally encountered in the daily lives, or in the routine medical,
dental, or psychological examination of healthy persons.").
56. Id.
57. Jerry Menikoff, Dir., Office for Human Research Prots., Town Hall Meeting on Common
Rule
NPRM
(Oct.
20,
2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/regulations/
transcriptoct20townhall.html [https://perma.cc/DQ2N-F6L3] ("The Common Rule has been around
for 25 years, but the precursor versions of it were not all that different and those actually date
back decades before that .... ).

1712

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:5:1703

1. Common Problems
The Common Rule was both structurally and procedurally
deficient.5 8 Structural problems stemmed from the disconnect between
current research practices and the regulatory regime created in 1991.
Technology, "including imaging, mobile technologies, and the growth in
computing power," has modernized the collection and storage of humansubject information and facilitates combining, mining, and sharing
human-subject data in ways that "were simply not possible, or even
59 Reimaginable, when the Common Rule was first adopted."
identification-the process by which anonymized personal data are
60
matched with their true owner-implicates privacy concerns. The
Common Rule required IRBs to review protection plans and determine
their adequacy "with respect to the informational risks of [the] study,"
but IRBs were not designed to evaluate privacy risks, and they had little
expertise in privacy matters. 6 1 Further, even if a privacy violation
occurred, the Common Rule did not provide a private right of action or
other options for corrective action.
Public engagement in research has also changed since the
Common Rule's inception. Research is no longer paternalistic; it is
increasingly participatory. 6 2 Human subjects "want to play an active
role in research, particularly related to health." 6 3 For example, patients
in the clinical setting are no longer passive recipients of medical
treatment and advice. 64 Instead, over the past half century, patients
more actively participate in decisions about their health and health
care. 65 The participatory model "emerged alongside a broader trend in
American society, facilitated by the widespread use of social media, in
which Americans are increasingly sharing identifiable personal
58.

See Alan R. Fleischman, Regulating Research with Human Subjects-Is the System

Broken?, 116 TRANSACTIONS AM. CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL AsS'N 91, 91 (2005) (explaining the

existing system is "strain[ed] under the weight of a changed research environment and inadequate
resources").
59. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,938 (Sept.
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46); Jacob Metcalf & Kate Crawford, Where Are Human
Subjects in Big Data Research? The Emerging Ethics Divide, BIG DATA & SOC'Y, Jan.-June 2016,
[https://perma.ccfVWD2at 6, http://journals.sagepub.com/doilfull/10.1177/2053951716650211
NZQJ].
60. See, e.g., Mats G. Hansson et al., The Risk of Re-identification Versus the Need to Identify
Individuals in Rare Disease Research, 24 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 1553, 1555 (2016) ("It has been
suggested that any re-identification may potentially harm study participants because it will
release information on individual disease risks into the public domain.").
61. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,978.
62. See Hudson & Collins, supra note 8, at 2293.
63. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,938.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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information." 66 Public databases ease re-identification; however,
Americans expect to be involved in decisions on how the information
they voluntarily provide might be shared in the future.6 7
IRB review and informed consent also faced procedural issues.
IRBs at individual sites, or "local IRBs," were inconsistent. 68 They
varied in "practices, resources, quality,
and experience." 69
Inconsistencies led to unpredictable delays that were costly to
researchers. 70 Further, research often took place at multiple sites.
Multisite studies experienced long review periods, exclusion of some
sites, and "substantial duplication of effort." 7 ' Inconsistent review
processes made it difficult to predict if and when a study might
proceed.72 Once research began, IRBs tended to do little to monitor the
actual performance of the study.73
Further, IRBs compounded the problem of "informed consent
requirements."7 4 First, the Common Rule required IRB approval of
informed consent forms.75 In multisite studies, local IRB review might
have resulted in varied consent forms and different eligibility criteria. 76.
Next, informed consent forms, essential to protect human subjects'
autonomy, were onerous and burdensome for researchers.7 7 Creating a
form that not only complied with the Common Rule but also relayed
scientific information in a comprehensible manner was "a formidable
challenge."7 8 Forms were unduly long-most were fifteen to twenty
pages-and buried pertinent information deep in the consent form that
human subjects might need to make an informed decision. 79 Rather

66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See Fleischman, supranote 58, at 96.
69. Id.
70. See id. ("Local IRBs have contributed to inordinate delays in initiating trials, exclusion of
some sites from participation in a trial, substantial duplication of effort and extraordinary time
commitments by core personnel and trial sponsors.").
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See id. ("Assessment of performance is perhaps the most important problem facing the
system for human subjects protection since there are no standard measures of outcome or
performance for the system as a whole or to assess IRB performance or quality.").
74. Hamburger, supra note 45, at 298.
75. Criteria for IRB Approval of Research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4)-(6) (2017).
76. See Hamburger, supra note 45, at 298.
77. See Fleischman, supra note 58, at 96; Anvita Pandiya, Readability and Comprehensibility
of Informed Consent Forms for Clinical Trials, 1 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 98, 99 (2010) ("Besides
giving medical information to the patient, the consent form must also convey complexities like trial
design, randomization, placebo, possible risks and benefits, treatment options, rights to withdraw,
and so forth.").
78. Pandiya, supra note 77, at 99.
79. See id.
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than enhance human-subject protections, the Common Rule's consent
requirements merely added administrative hurdles.
2. Cases and Controversies
Litigation and ethical controversies also influenced the debate
reform of human-subject protections. First, judicial
regulatory
over
opinions since the Common Rule's promulgation demonstrate
conflicting approaches to human-subject protections. Although there
are virtually no cases involving Common Rule violations,80 some state
and federal courts have addressed informed consent and secondary
research.8 1 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit worried that
the lack of either notice or informed consent for secondary use might
violate prevailing medical standards. 82 The Eighth Circuit, on the other
hand, held that "individuals who make an informed decision to
contribute their biological materials" no longer retain an ownership
right "to direct or authorize the transfer of such materials to a third
party."

83

The most prominent support of regulatory reform came from a
2008 Arizona Court of Appeals case, which ended in an out-of-court
settlement.8 4 The Havasupai Tribe filed a lawsuit for misuse of
volunteered blood samples.8 5 As part of the out-of-court settlement, the
Havasupai received $700,000, and researchers returned blood samples
to the tribe. 86 Although the settlement did not create legal precedent,
"it implied that the rights of research subjects can be violated when they
are not fully informed about how their DNA might be used."

7

Ethical controversies also sparked debates on research limits
and human-subject protections. 8 8 In 1999, Jesse Gelsinger's death

&

80. The Common Rule does not provide a private right of action or options for recourse.
81. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. While these cases do not deal directly with
research, they illuminate how courts addressed secondary use of personal data.
82. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) ("One
can think of few subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy interests than
of one's health or genetic make-up.").
83. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007).
84. Havasupai Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 106667 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Havasupai Tribe and the Lawsuit Settlement Aftermath, AM. INDIAN
ALASKA

NATIVE

GENETICS

RESOURCE

CTR.,

http://genetics.ncai.org/case-study/havasupai-

Tribe.cfm?pdf=1& (last visited June 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/223J-TY26].
85. HavasupaiTribe of HavasupaiReservation, 204 P.3d at 1066.
86. See Amy Harmon, Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit Research of Its DNA, N.Y. TIMES
[https://perma.cc/7GDN(Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html
F4SR].
87. Id.
88. See Joshua D. Smith et al., Immortal Life of the Common Rule: Ethics, Consent and the
Future of Cancer Research, 35 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1879, 1879 (2017).
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during a gene therapy trial sparked oversight concerns after
subsequent media reports exposed the lead researcher's financial
interest in the trial's outcome.8 9 The case of Henrietta Lacks is another
telling example.9 0 HeLa cells, identified by the first two letters of Ms.
Lacks's first and last names, shaped the future of medicine as the first
cell lines to divide infinitely.91 Ms. Lacks's husband orally consented to
the harvesting of his wife's cells, but only after the researchers
promised to give him the results of their findings. 92 The researchers
neither informed the Lacks family of HeLa's influence on science nor
shared profits derived from her unique cells. 93 When the Lacks's story
was published in 2010, it sparked new debates on the ethics, limits, and
protections of human subjects. 94
II. FINAL SAY: THE NEW COMMON RULE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
To address changes in research, the U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services ("HHS") published an Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("ANPRM") on July 26, 2011, seeking comments on
modernizing the Common Rule. 95 HHS then published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") on September 8, 2015, reflecting some
of the ANPRM's public feedback. 96 The NPRM sought comment on
"proposals to better protect human subjects . . . while facilitating
valuable research and reducing burden, delay, and ambiguity for
investigators." 9 7
89. Robin F. Wilson, The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the Influence of Money
and Prestigein Human Research, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 295-96 (2010).
90.

See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).

91. Jane Dailey, "The Immortal Life of HenriettaLacks" by Rebecca Skloot, CHI. TRIB. (Nov.
17,
2010),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/books/chi-the-immortal-life-of-henrietta111710-story.html [https://perma.cc/EK2Q-JXZL].
92. Rebecca Skloot, Henrietta'sDance, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG. (Apr. 2000), http://pages.jh.edu/
jhumag/0400web/01.html [https://perma.cc/3TM3-9V3F].
93. Id.
94. See Smith et al., supra note 88, at 1879. After Lacks's story was published, informed
consent "dominated discussion of the book," followed by the "welfare of the vulnerable and
compensation." Laura M. Beskow, Lessons from HeLa Cells: The Ethics and PolicyofBiospecimens,
17 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 395, 396 (2016). Further, "[djiscussion in professional
literature comprised a similar array of themes, including marked emphasis on informed consent,
as well as commercialization and compensation; privacy and confidentiality; race, poverty, and
health disparities; familial implications of genetic information; ownership of biospecimens; and
trust in biomedical research." Id. at 396-97 (citations omitted).
95. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,512 (July
26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164).
96. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,933
(Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
97. Id.
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In compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, HHS
98
requested and considered comments on the NPRM. At the end of the
comment period, interested parties submitted more than 2,100
comments. 99 While some comments supported efforts to enhance the
Common Rule,10 0 others found the NPRM "unnecessarily complex and
hard to interpret."1 0 1 After much deliberation, the Final Rule was
published on January 19, 2017.102 This Part provides an overview of the
Final Rule, including proposed changes in the NPRM, comments on the
NPRM, and potential consequences.
A. Proposed Changes, Comments, and the Final Rule
HHS proposed eight major changes to the Common Rule. 103 This
Note addresses changes affecting identifiable private information in
three broad categories: (1) reconsidering IRB review, (2) requiring
privacy safeguards, and (3) improving consent. This Section provides an
overview of these three proposed changes in the NPRM. This Section
also discusses selected comments on the NPRM and analyzes the
comments' influence on the Final Rule's text. The comments selected
were submitted by well-known, reputable medical and research
institutions and professional organizations. By examining the concerns
and priorities of various parties, this Note's final recommendation offers
a refined regulation that better balances the interests of human
subjects and researchers.1 04
1. IRB Review
The NPRM proposed two significant changes to IRB review:
single IRB review of multisite research and elimination of some

98. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
99. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7152 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
100. Id.
101. Jennifer K. Lodge & David H. Perlmutter, Washington University in St. Louis School of
Medicine, Comment Letter on the Department of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule:
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Jan. 5, 2016), https://research.wustl.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Common-Rule-Comment-Letter.pdf [https://perma.ccMX5K-GD2T]; see
Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7152 (listing submitted
comments on the proposed rule).
102. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2017).
103. See Menikoff, supra note 57. The proposed changes not discussed in this Note include
regulating de-identified biospecimens, extending the Common Rule to clinical trials, and revising
categories of exempt research. See id.
104. The analysis also informs the approach this Note posits in adopting a modified version of
the Privacy Rule. See infra Parts III-IV.
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continuing review. 105 These changes aimed to streamline IRB review,
reduce inefficiencies, and hold independent IRBs directly responsible
for compliance. 106
First, the NPRM proposed a mandate for single IRB review of
multisite research at U.S. institutions. 107 This mandate applied unless
local laws required more than single IRB review or a federal
department or agency determined single IRB review was not
appropriate.108 This change also provided Common Rule departments
and agencies explicit "authority to enforce compliance" directly against
independent IRBs "not operated by an assured institution."1 0 9 This
encouraged institutions to rely on a single IRB rather than various local

IRBs. 11 0

Second, the NPRM proposed eliminating continuing review for
minimal risk studies, which usually qualify for expedited review.1 1 1 The
proposal also eliminated continuing review for studies "initially
reviewed by a convened IRB ... after the study reaches the stage where
it involves" either analyzing data or "accessing follow-up clinical data.
from procedures that subjects undergo as part of standard care for their
medical condition or disease." 112 In either case, an IRB could require
continuing review but would have to document its rationale. 1 13 Overall,
this proposed change aimed to make IRB operations more efficient. 1 1 4
By reducing continuing review, IRBs could, in theory, allocate more
time to riskier studies involving human subjects.1 15
The proposal to mandate single IRB review of multisite
research, one of the most commented-on proposals in the NPRM,

105. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,937
(Sept. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
106. Id. at 53,981.
107. Id. at 53,983; see also Single IRB Policy for Multi-site Research, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH,
https://grants.nih.gov/policy/clinical-trials/single-irb-policy-multi-site-research.htm
(last visited
Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F7TD-9QET] ("Historically, in many multi-site studies, each site
has its own IRB which conducts an independent review of studies involving human research
participants. The use of a single IRB of record for multi-site studies that are conducting the same
protocol will help streamline the IRB review process by eliminating the unnecessary repetition of
those reviews across sites.").
108. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,983.
109. Id.
110. See Menikoff, supranote 57.
111. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,985.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 53,986.
114. Id. at 53,984.
115. See id. at 53,936 ("Research that poses greater risk to subjects should receive more
oversight and deliberation than less risky research."); Menikoff, supranote 57.
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received over three hundred comments. 116 Approximately 130
supported the proposal, 140 opposed it, and the remaining had mixed
views.1 1 7 Supporters, including both individuals and scientific
organizations, 118 believed the mandate reduced administrative burdens
and costs. 119 On the other hand, research institutions tended to oppose
120 These
the mandate and advocated for optional single-IRB review.
opponents argued that the mandate increased administrative burdens
and lessened human-subject protections because of "[d]ifferences in
institutional policies and procedures, scopes of work at each site, and
local cultures." 12 1
In the end, the Final Rule adopted single-IRB review of multisite
research.1 22 Regulators made single-IRB review mandatory rather than
optional because "systematic efficiencies have the best chance of
occurring if single IRB review is required."1 23 To provide flexibility in
adjusting to the new model, the Final Rule adopts a delayed compliance
date of three years from publication. 124
Concerning eliminating some continuing review, the NPRM
received approximately 120 comments, with roughly ninety-five
comments supporting the proposal. 12 5 Supporters believed the proposal

&

116. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7208 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
117. Id.
118. Id. Individual supporters are "those who were not providing comment in an official
institutional capacity." Id.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Sharon F. Terry, Genetic Alliance, Comment Letter on the Department of Health
(Jan. 2,
& Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects
2
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=HHS-OPHS- 015-00082016),
[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/D2WP-XNUB]
1806&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf
Genetic Alliance Comment]. Other institutions that believed single IRB review should be optional
included, but were not limited to, Vanderbilt University, Boston University, the University of
Chicago, and Brown University. See infra notes 121, 135-136, 158.
121. David A. Savitz, Brown University, Comment Letter on the Department of Health
Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Jan. 6, 2016),
2
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHS-OPHS- 015-00081510&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/Q44Z-9HK5] ("The only scenario
for which we see the mandate for use of a central IRB adding value is when a study involves
identical procedures and involvement at each site. In these instances, however, it seems more
appropriate for the funding agency to require the use of a single IRB.").
122. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7209.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., William T. Tucker, University of California System, Comment Letter on the
Department of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=HHSOPHS-2015-0008-1062&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/9L6M-X4SA]
("[C]ontinuing review for minimal risk research imposes an administrative burden that does not
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alleviated IRB administrative burdens, while opponents argued that
continuing review importantly allowed researchers "to periodically reevaluate the benefits, risks, methods, and procedures used in research
activities." 1 2 6 With strong support, the Final Rule adopted the NPRM's
change as proposed. 127
2. Privacy Safeguards
To assure appropriate privacy and confidentiality protections of
human subjects' identifiable private information, the NPRM proposed
having several sets of standards promulgated by the secretary of HHS,
allowing researchers to choose which standard to use. 128 The
safeguards, published in the Federal Register, would involve minimal
cost and effort to implement and would assure that data "posing
informational risks to subjects would be protected according to
appropriate standards." 129 If researchers met these safeguards, there
would be no need for additional IRB review. 130 Additionally, compliance
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which better addressed informational
risks by restricting the use and disclosure of identifiable data, would
also satisfy the Common Rule requirements. 131
The NPRM received approximately 130 comments addressing
privacy safeguards,1 32 most of which supported the proposal. 1 3 3 Both

.

result in the discovery of information or raise issues that require IRB review or investigator
action.").
126. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7205.
127. Id.
128. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,979 (Sept.
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
129. Id.; see Menikoff, supra note 57 ("So the goal is that these would be common sense, easily
implemented standards.").
130. See Menikoff, supra note 57 ("[T]he default position is that if the privacy standards . .
are met, there will be no need for additional IRB Review .... ).
131. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,979; see Menikoff,
supra note 57 ("An institution could abide by the HIPAA rules, so any institution that is bound by
HIPAA is already meeting these standards."). The NPRM also listed eight additional statutes and
acts that might be reasonable to include in the new Common Rule. Federal Policy for the Protection
of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,979-80. The Privacy Rule is discussed in detail infra Part
III.
132. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7202.
133. Id. Many comments expressed support through a form letter that included the following
statement: "I endorse the following ...
[p]roposal to develop standards deemed sufficient to
safeguard privacy in addition to those set forth in HIPAA." COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS,

ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC

COMMENTS ON THE COMMON RULE

NPRM

12

(2016),

http://www.cogr.edulsites/default/files/Analysis%20f%2oCommon%2ORule%2OComments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8DK-CB3H]. The American Society for Investigative Pathology posted the form
letter. Comment Letter on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Common Rule, AM. SOC'Y FOR
INVESTIGATIVE

PATHOLOGY

(Nov.

23,

2015),
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supporters and opponents agreed, however, that "it was difficult to
comment on the adequacy of privacy standards that had yet to be
developed." 134 Those opposed also criticized incorporating HIPAA
protections for various reasons. 1 35
Some commenters linked privacy with protecting autonomy and
suggested Congress create a statutory right of action to remedy
informational harms. 13 6 Under the Common Rule, and under the
NPRM's proposed changes, human subjects had virtually no options for
recourse. One commenter explained that the United States' failure to
require compensation for research-related injuries made it an outlier
137
"in this respect in the international community."
Despite majority support, the Final Rule did not adopt the
privacy proposal in the NPRM. 138 Instead, the Final Rule "retains and
http://www.asip.org/SciencePolicy/documents/ASIPCommentsNPRMCommonRule.pdf
[https:Hperma.cc/CX3R-K3KC].
134. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7202; see, e.g., Lois
Brako, University of Michigan Human Research Protection Program, Comment Letter on the
Department of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHSOPHS-2015-0008-1277&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/22DX-RNN6]
[hereinafter University of Michigan Comment] ("Regarding ... the yet-to-be-developed ... privacy
protections, we are unable to comment ... as no specific standards are present."); Alexander E.
Dreier, Yale University, Comment Letter on the Department of Health & Human Services
Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Jan. 6, 2016),
20 5
1 -0008https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=HHS-OPHS(requesting
[https://perma.cc/R334-B67M]
1749&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf
further clarification on privacy protections in the NPRM).
135. See, e.g., Gordon R. Bernard, Vanderbilt University, Comment Letter on the Department
of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects
2
(Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHS-OPHS- 015the
(arguing
0008-1188&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/2CCX-4N3A]
cost of implementing HIPAA would be tremendous and not add any value); University of Michigan
Comment, supra note 134 ("[W]e know that HIPAA standards do not fit for all cases of human
research and we would discourage the broader application of HIPAA or HIPAA-like standards.");
Michael D. Rich, Rand Corporation, Comment Letter on the Department of Health & Human
Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Jan. 5, 2016),
2
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHS-OPHS- 015-0008(explaining that
[https://perma.cc/HW4X-FEA4]
1390&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf
researchers (1) are not well-versed in HIPAA and (2) could not make informed self-determinations
that HIPAA would apply).
136. Jessica L. Roberts, University of Houston Law Center, & Valerie G. Koch, University of
Chicago, Comment Letter on the Department of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal
2015),
5,
(Jan.
Subjects
of
Human
Protection
the
for
Policy
2
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHS-OPHS- 015-00081348&attachmentNumber=l&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/X2SF-MS8B].
137. Id. In 2013, the United States failed to sign the seventh edition of the Declaration of
Helsinki, a set of ethical principles regarding human experimentation developed by the World
Medical Association that added the following provision: "[a]ppropriate compensation and
treatment for subjects who are harmed as a result of participating in research must be ensured."
Id.
138. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7202.
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acknowledges the IRB's role in ensuring that privacy safeguards are
appropriate for the research studies that require IRB review."1 39
Additionally, the Final Rule requires the secretary of HHS to issue
guidance to assist IRBs in protecting human subjects' privacy and
confidentiality. 14 0 The regulatory text explains that this approach
avoids promulgating "a regulation that lack[s] sufficient specificity."141
Further, the text states "IRBs have been responsible for evaluating
such risks under the pre-2018 rule," and further guidance would make
them more effective. 14 2
3. Consent
The NPRM proposed tightening informed consent requirements
to make the process of obtaining consent more meaningful by
establishing a reasonable person standard.143 Consent forms would be
drafted "in a way that facilitates" a reasonable person's understanding
"of the reasons why one might or might not want to participate."1 4 4 Inlight of the reasonable person standard, the proposed changes included'
revising "unduly long [consent] documents." 145 Consent forms would
provide essential information in a clear, organized, and sufficient
manner to human subjects to assist their decisionmaking process. 146
Further, to ensure that the proposed modifications did indeed
change current practices, the NPRM mandated a "one-time posting
requirement" for consent forms. 147 This way, drafters knew that their
forms would be subject to public scrutiny.148 By increasing
transparency, regulators believed these changes would better protect

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The Final Rule also acknowledges that IRBs were not specifically designed to evaluate
(1) risks to privacy and confidentiality and (2) the adequacy of safeguards to protect against those
risks. Id.
143. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. 53,933, 53,936 (Sept.
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46); see Menikoff, supra note 57 ("[Sjome of the changes will
require the document to provide essential information that a reasonable person would want to
know. . . a standard bar from the legal world in terms of clinical consent in a nonresearch
setting.").
144. Menikoff, supranote 57; see Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 53,936.
145. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,936.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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human subjects-the ultimate goal of informed consent-and build
trust. 149

Another major change required consent "for the use of all
1 50
biospecimens in research, whether or not they [were] deidentified."
In the context of secondary (or future) research, obtaining additional
informed consent for the use of identifiable private information is
burdensome. 15 1 As a result, the NPRM proposed broad consent as an
alternative to informed consent. 152 With broad consent, human subjects
would consent to unknown future research without additional informed
consent. 15 3 Thus, human subjects would not be afforded another
opportunity to decide whether they wanted their identifiable private
information used in a particular way. To compensate for the loss in
human-subject autonomy from broad consent, IRBs would not be
permitted to waive consent if human subjects were asked to provide
broad consent and declined. 154
Approximately two hundred comments discussed the NPRM's
proposal to "include information required by the Common Rule in the
consent form and place other information in appendices."1 5 5 Supporters
(approximately 140 commenters) agreed informed consent documents
should be shorter and easier to understand. 156 Approximately thirtyfive commenters opposed the change because human subjects'
decisionmaking process would not be improved and the lack of specific
standards would make the provision impossible to implement. 157 Other
[but] felt the
commenters liked "the general idea of the proposal . .

149. Id.; see Menikoff, supra note 57 ("[Slome people think it's often lawyers trying to protect
the institution [who] have written a document that's more helpful in terms of protecting
institutions as oppose[d] to the goal of genuinely doing a good job in terms of informing the
subject.").
150. Hudson & Collins, supra note 8, at 2294; see Federal Policy for the Protection of Human
Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,972.
151. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 80 Fed. Reg. at 53,972 ("Critics
of the existing rules have observed that the current requirements for informed consent for future
research with pre-existing information and biospecimens are confusing and consume substantial
amounts of investigators' and IRBs' time and resources.").
152. Id.
153. Id. at 53,973.
154. Id. at 53,975-76. The NPRM states that broad consent is different than informed consent;
thus, broad consent forms should "ensure that the individual would be provided with sufficient
information to make an informed decision about whether to agree to provide broad consent for a
wide variety of research that may be unforeseen at the time in which consent is being sought." Id.
at 53,973. The NPRM imposed strict IRB waiver requirements for secondary research and
explicitly stated that waiver is intended to be "extremely rare." Id. at 53,976.
155. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7211 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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proposal should not focus on the length of a consent form, but rather on
clarity and understandability." 158
The Final Rule mandates six significant revisions to the
requirements of informed consent1 59 and adopts "almost verbatim" all
proposals made in the NPRM to improve, clarify, and streamline
informed consent. 160 Consistent with public comments, the Final Rule
adopts an approach "emphasizing efforts to foster understanding
overall rather than imposing specific length limitations on the entire
consent forms." 16 1 This approach allows regulated research entities "to
pursue different and innovative approaches to obtaining informed
consent." 162
With regard to broad consent, the NPRM received 475
comments, mostly in opposition to the proposal "that some type of
consent (broad or specific) would be required for research with
nonidentified
biospecimens."1 63 Approximately
150 comments
addressed "the adequacy or inadequacy" of broad consent, or broad
consent templates to be created by HHS.1 64 Commenters also,;
questioned whether broad consent was actually meaningful consent. 1 6 5
The Final Rule makes broad consent a permissible option only
for secondary research use of identifiable private information.16 6 In
response to public comments, the Final Rule requires a general
description "of the types of research that may be conducted with
identifiable private information" that a reasonable person would want
or need to know. 167 Lastly, the Final Rule does not include the NPRM's

158. Id.; see, e.g., Gloria Waters, Boston University, Comment Letter on the Department of
Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects
(Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=HHS-OPHS-20150008-0597&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3ALY-NRQZ] [hereinafter
Boston University Comment] (suggesting consent documents be formatted in a list with bullet
points to help human subjects make informed decisions).
159. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7210. The six major
revisions include the following: (1) new requirements for content, organization, and presentation
of information; (2) basic and additional elements of consent; (3) the elements of broad consent for
the storage, maintenance, or secondary research use of identifiable private information; (4)
changes in waiver or alteration criteria for consent; (5) a new provision that allows IRBs to approve
a research proposal without individuals' informed consent in specific situations; and (6) a new
requirement to post a copy of an IRB-approved version of the consent form on a federal website.
Id.
160. Id. at 7213.
161. Id.; see Boston University Comment, supra note 158.
162. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7214.
163. Id. at 7218.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 7220.
167. Id. at 7221.
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provision that the secretary of HHS establish broad consent
templates. 168 Thus, institutions can create and tailor their own broad
consent forms. 169
B. New Consequences
The Final Rule differs considerably from the NPRM, reflecting
"the power of the research institutions' lobby." 170 By increasing access
to identifiable private information under broad consent and by limiting
oversight, the Final Rule alleviates administrative burdens for both
researchers and the IRB. As a result, "the research world will . . be
awash in unwittingly donated-and not anonymized" human-subject
data. 171
Accordingly, the Final Rule will likely have the unintended
consequence of increasing privacy risks. 172 Concerning consent, the
Final Rule allows researchers to choose between informed consent or
broad consent, which creates a lose-lose situation. 173 Informed consent
protects subject autonomy but, even with the Final Rule's streamlined
informed consent documents, increases administrative burdens. On the
other hand, broad consent for identifiable private information
eliminates any incentive to de-identify human-subject data. 174 Further,
even though broad consent does not replace informed consent, multiple
bioethics scholars concluded in 2015 that broad consent "in many cases
[is] optimal" and will likely be preferred by researchers because it
175
significantly reduces administrative burdens.
168. Id. at 7222.
169. Id.
170. Timothy Caulfield & Blake Murdoch, Genes, Cells, and Biobanks: Yes, There's Still a
25,
2017),
(July
2
BIOLOGY
PLOS
Problem,
Consent
journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2002654&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/2SJL-5BWU].
171. John Conley, Some Thoughts on the New Common Rule for Human Subjects3Research,
29
PRIVACY REP. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2017/0 / /somethoughts-on-the-new-common-rule-for-human-subjects-research/ [https://perma.cc/HJ8A-6FXN].
172. See Roy A. Jensen, University of Kansas Cancer Center, Comment Letter on the
Department of Health & Human Services Proposed Rule: Federal Policy for the Protection of
2015),
28,
(Dec.
Subjects
Human
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=HHS-OPHS-2015-0008[hereinafter
[https://perma.cc/A3YD-KP7J]
1157&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
University of Kansas Comment] (discussing privacy concerns).
173. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. at 7220.
174. See University of Kansas Comment, supra note 172.
175. Christine Grady et al., Broad Consent for Research with Biological Samples: Workshop
Conclusions, 15 Am. J. BIOETHICS 34, 39 (2015). The bioethics scholars that took part in the
workshop agreed that broad consent is optimal when the following three components are attached:
(1) initial broad consent; (2) process of oversight and approval of future research activities; and (3)
wherever feasible, an ongoing communication process. Id.
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The primary risk raised by research is the unintended revelation
of the human subject's identity. 176 Limited oversight and broad consent
for secondary research compound this risk. First, the IRB and
researchers often shirk their responsibility to ensure ethical research
processes.17 7 The American Association of Universities conducted a
systematic review of reports that addressed problems with Common
Rule compliance at universities. 178 The report concluded that humansubject protection has "not always been subject to the continuing review
and monitoring it needs to ensure that it is functioning as well as this
vital area of research protections requires."1 79 The Final Rule only
exacerbates this problem.
As informational risks rise, the new regulation does not provide
any legally enforceable rights to human subjects to prevent, monitor, or
remedy privacy violations. 18 0 The University of Kansas addresses this
concern in its comment on the NPRM: "All human biospecimens and the
information derived therefrom are deserving of the highest level of
security.. . . The regulations have failed to address sanctions for the
unauthorized re-identification of subjects." 181 Broad consent inhibits
the ability of human subjects "to be truly informed about the objectives
and details of the research" and does not respect human subjects'
"values and personal preferences." 1 82 More problematically, broad
consent inadequately protects human subjects against new and
unpredictable regulatory changes. 183 Like the original Common Rule,
the Final Rule is merely a compilation of requirements that lacks
judicial relief.

176. PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE, supra note 9, at 5.

177. Dave Maass, More Needs to Be Done to Strengthen Protection of Human Subjects in
Scientific

Experiments,

ELECTRONIC

FRONTIER

FOUND.

(Jan.

7,

2016),

.

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/more-needs-be-done-strengthen-protection-humansubjects-scientific-experiments
[https://perma.cc/M7ZE-NVY6]
("[M]eaningful oversight. .
requires after-the-fact accountability.").

178. ASS'N OF AM. UNIVS., REPORT ON UNIVERSITY PROTECTIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS WHO ARE
THE SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 2 (2000).

179. Id.
180. Numerous public comments on the NPRM sought rights and remedies for human
subjects. See University of Kansas Comment, supra note 172.
181. Id.
182. Isabelle Budin-Ljesne et al., Dynamic Consent: A Potential Solution to Some of the
Challenges of Modern Biomedical Research, BMC MED. ETHICS 2 (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/sl2910-016-0162-9
[https://perma.cc/W84K-X9SE] [hereinafter Dynamic Consent: A PotentialSolution].
183. Id.
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III. ANOTHER PRIVATE MATTER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE

In contrast to the Final Rule's weakened human-subject
protections, the Privacy Rule provides stronger safeguards for
participants. Although the Final Rule rejected Privacy Rule compliance,
NPRM comments suggest components of the Privacy Rule would better
protect human subjects.
As background, Congress enacted HIPAA in 1996184 to protect
patient health information "given emerging advances in information
technology." 18 5 Under HIPAA's administrative simplification provision,
Congress instructed HHS to submit "detailed recommendations on
standards with respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health
information." 186 Per this provision, HHS developed the Privacy Rule, "a
set of national standards for the protection of certain health
information."1 8 7
The Privacy Rule, promulgated in 2001 and amended in 2013,
protects the use and disclosure of PHI. 188 PHI is individually
identifiable health information transmitted by or maintained in
electronic media or "any other form or medium." 189 The language in the
Privacy Rule is nuanced. Individually identifiable health information is
defined as a subset of health informationl 90 and includes an individual's
91
demographic information, "created or received" by a covered entity'
and related to the mental health, provision of health care, or payment
of health care of an individual. 192
19 3
Research is not a primary focus of the Privacy Rule.
Nonetheless, HHS included research provisions in the Privacy Rule to

184. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
185. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 35 (Conn. 2014).
186. § 264, 110 Stat. at 2033.
187. Id.; HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2017).
188. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164.
189. Id.
190. Health information is any information "created or received by a health care provider,
health plan... , or health care clearinghouse" that relates to the mental health condition, health
care, or payments of health care to an individual. Id. § 160.103.
191. Covered entities include health plans, health-care clearinghouses, and health-care
providers "who transmit[ ] any health information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction covered by this subchapter." Id.
192. Id.
193. COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH & THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING
PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 86 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter
BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE].
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"remedy perceived shortcoming[s] of federal privacy protections in
health research under the Common Rule." 194 The U.S. General
Accounting Office ("GAO") prepared a report in 1999 detailing weak
human-subject protections in anticipation of the Privacy Rule.195
Specifically, the GAO reported that the typical complaint made by
human subjects was "lack of privacy and confidentiality."1 9 6 Further,
the report documented investigations by the HHS Office for Protection
from Research Risks. 19 7 These investigations found human-subject
protection violations stemmed from "(1) research subject to IRB review
and (2) research outside federal protection."1 9 8 HHS considered this
report, among other recommendations, when drafting the Privacy
Rule's research protections.1 99
The Privacy Rule and the Final Rule were both reactions to the
inadequate Common Rule. However, the Privacy Rule provides patients
stronger privacy protections than the Final Rule. Importantly, it
engages users of PHI in discussing how to secure and protect patient
privacy and imposes penalties for privacy violations. The Privacy Rule,
however, is not perfect. It is burdensome, formalistic, and, at times, too
restrictive. The distinctions between the Privacy Rule and Final Rule
inform this Note's final recommendation. This Part discusses legal
rights and research provisions under the Privacy Rule as well as options
for corrective action when privacy violations occur.
A. Legal Rights and Research Provisions
The Privacy Rule establishes legally enforceable rights for
individuals who are the subject of PHI 200 and provides recourse to
patients who fall victim to privacy violations. The Final Rule, in
contrast, does not establish any rights. 201
The Privacy Rule establishes the general right to authorize use
or disclosure of PHI for research. 202 This general right is coupled with

194. Id. at 27.
195. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY: ACCESS NEEDED FOR
HEALTH RESEARCH, BUT OVERSIGHT OF PRIVACY PROTECTIONS IS LIMITED (1999).

196. Id. at 16.
197. Id. The Office for Protection from Research Risks is now OHRP. Office for Human
Research Protections, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited
June 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6FH5-L6HD].

198. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193, at 163.
199. Id.
200. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, .520, .528 (2017).
201. Instead, the Common Rule (and Final Rule) "[safeguard] the rights and welfare of human
subjects." Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(1).
202. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508.
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the right to adequate notice of use and disclosure of PHI and the right
to an accounting of disclosures of PHI. 2 0 3 These rights increase
awareness "of persons or entities . . . in possession of [PHI]."204
An authorization must include six core elements as well as
205
statements that adequately put an individual sharing PHI on notice.
Of particular relevance, the authorization must be "specific and
meaningful" and provide notice of the individual's right to revoke the
authorization in writing. 206 Further, the authorization must include a
207
description of each purpose of the requested use or disclosure. Under
208 Unspecified
this requirement, PHI research must be study specific.
20 9
future research is invalid under the Privacy Rule.
The Privacy Rule permits waiver of authorization in whole or in
part by an IRB or privacy board. 210 A privacy board consists of diverse
members that "review the effect of the research protocol on the
individual's privacy rights and related interests." 2 11 Unlike the Final
Rule, the Privacy Rule does not require an IRB or privacy board to
review authorization forms. 212
Unauthorized PHI use requires "the information be used and
disclosed under strict conditions that safeguard individuals'
confidentiality." 2 1 3 Thus, the Privacy Rule sets "complex standards" for
IRBs and privacy boards to apply in determining waiver of
authorization. 2 1 4 The IRB and privacy board must determine that the
following are true: (1) the use or disclosure of PHI involves no more than
a minimal privacy risk; (2) "[t]he research could not practicably be

203. Id.

§§

164.520, 164.528.

204. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193, at 51.

205. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)-(2). The six core elements are as follows: (1) a description that
identifies the requested information in a "specific and meaningful fashion"; (2) the name or other
specific identification of the person or entity authorized to make the requested information; (3) the
name or other specific identification of the persons or entity to which the requested information
may be disclosed; (4) a description of the purpose for which the information is requested; (5) an
expiration date or expiration event that relates to the individual or the purpose for which the
information is requested; and (6) a dated signature of the patient or the patient's representative
with a description of the representative's authority to act on behalf of the patient. Id.
§ 164.508(c)(1)(i)-(vi).
206. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(i), (vi).
207. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv).
208. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193, at 164-65.
209. Id.
210. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(A)-(B).
211. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(B)(1). At least one member of the privacy board must not be affiliated
with the covered entity or research sponsor. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(B)(2). Further, no member of the
privacy board can have a conflict of interest. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i)(B)(3).
212. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv).
213. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193, at 167.
214. Id. at 168.
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conducted without the waiver or alteration"; and (3) "the research could
not practicably be conducted" without the PHI. 2 15 Covered entities can
rely on waiver approved by a single IRB or privacy board with
jurisdiction. 216
Authorization is more explicit than consent and the nuance is
critical: authorization grants permission to use or disclose PHI whereas
consent signifies an agreement to participate in research. 2 17
Authorization is a detailed document that provides the "how, why, and
to whom the PHI will be used and/or disclosed for research." 218 In
contrast, informed consent documents include a description of the
study, anticipated risks and benefits, and how the confidentiality of
records will be protected, among other things. 219 Voluntary consent is
not sufficient under the Privacy Rule unless "it also satisfies the
requirements of a valid authorization." 2 2 0 Authorization allows patients
to know and direct how information about them is being used. Thus, the
Privacy Rule prohibits one hallmark of the Final Rule: broad consent..
for unspecified future research. 22 1
The Privacy Rule, like HIPAA generally, produces a "heightened
awareness" for patient privacy, 222 but heightened awareness comes
with costs.

223

The Privacy Rule, like the Final Rule, improperly#

balances patients' and researchers' interests. The difference, however,
is the Privacy Rule is overly protective of patients whereas the Final
Rule is too relaxed on researchers. The rights granted under the Privacy
Rule-authorization, notice, and accounting of disclosures-create
extra bureaucracy and expense. A 2017 survey conducted by the
Association of Academic Health Centers found researchers.
"overwhelmingly believe that the HIPAA Privacy Rule has had a

215. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)-(C).
216. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(iv)(A).
217. HIPAA
Authorization for Research, NAT'L INSTS.
HEALTH (Apr.
2004),
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdflauthorization.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4SL-L79G].
218. BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193, at 315.
219. Id. at 164.
220. What Is the Difference Between "Consent"and 'Authorization" Under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/264/
what-is-the-difference-between-consent-and-authorizationlindex.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SD3Y-N54K].
221. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i) (authorization must be "specific and meaningful"),
with Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7220 (Jan. 19, 2017)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46) (broad consent is permissible for secondary research).
222. Neil Chesanow, Is HIPAA Creating More Problems than It's Preventing?, MEDSCAPE
(Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/810648 [https://perma.cc/3MTG-6LBV]
(quoting George D. Lundberg, MD, Editor at Large, Medscape).
223. See BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, supra note 193.
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negative impact on the scope, pace, and cost of research." 224 The survey
also characterized the Privacy Rule as having a negative impact on
recruiting research participants. 2 2 5 While continuous monitoring and
communication better protect patients' information and promote trust,
at times they can be impractical, ineffective, and inefficient. 22 6
B. A Novel Approach to Privacy Violations
The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to protect PHI. 2 2 7 If
an individual believes a covered entity violated his privacy rights, he
might take one of two corrective paths. The first path involves filing a
complaint with the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") of HHS. 2 2 8 OCR can
act on complaints only if a covered entity violated the Privacy Rule and
the complaint was filed within 180 days of the violation. 229 If OCR
determines the covered entity violated HIPAA, it can impose civil and
criminal penalties. 230 The second path involves making a state law
negligence claim. 231 This might seem odd because the Privacy Rule (and
HIPAA generally) does not provide a private right of action. Thus, an
individual affected by a privacy breach may not bring a civil claim
against a covered entity under HIPAA. Further, the Privacy Rule

224. MINDY J. STEINBERG & ELAINE R. RUBIN, THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: LACKS PATIENT
BENEFIT, IMPEDES RESEARCH GROWTH 10 (2009). Fifty-four respondents from twenty-seven

institutions responded to the survey. Id. at 2. Relevant findings included the following: (1) 59.1%
of respondents believed the Privacy Rule had a negative or strongly negative impact on the scope
of research, while only 7.5% said the impact was positive or strongly positive; (2) 81.3% of
respondents reported their institution had a designated official to assist researchers with Privacy
Rule issues; and (3) 76.6% of respondents said their IRB had assumed additional responsibilities
to address the Privacy Rule, of which 62.3% characterized the impact of these additional
responsibilities as negative or strongly negative, 20.8% said there was no impact on the IRB, and
11.3% said the impact was positive or strongly positive. Id. at 3-5.
225. Id. at 9. The survey found that 45.3% of respondents believed the Privacy Rule had a
negative or strongly negative impact on subject recruitment; 48.1% rated the impact on the cost of
recruiting participants as negative or strongly negative. Id.
226. Mark A. Rothstein, Research Privacy Under HIPAA and the Common Rule, 33 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 154, 154 (2005).
227. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c) (2017).
228. What to Expect, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/filing-acomplaint/what-to-expect/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MKK4-GB3F].
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Four elements are required to establish a prima facie case of negligence: (1) existence of
a legal duty that defendant owed to plaintiff; (2) defendant's breach of duty; (3) plaintiffs
sufferance of injury; and (4) proof that defendant's breach caused the injury. Negligence, WEX
LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/negligence (last visited Aug. 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/5FRA-UGGRI.
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preempts any contrary provision of state law. 2 32 Recent decisions by
state courts, however, held HIPAA is the standard industry practice for
health-care providers and may form the basis for state law negligence
claims involving disclosure of patient medical records. 233 Under this
path, state courts create what looks like a de facto private right of action

under HIPAA.

'

For example, consider the Connecticut Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Byrne. 234 In Byrne, the plaintiff instructed Avery
Center (a covered entity) not to release her medical records to the
estranged father of her child. 2 35 When the father filed paternity actions
against the plaintiff and subpoenaed Avery Center for the plaintiffs
medical records, Avery Center mailed the documents to the court
without notifying the plaintiff. 2 36 As a result, the plaintiff alleged she
suffered harassment and extortion threats from the father "since he
viewed her medical records." 237 The Connecticut Supreme Court
declared that HIPAA does not preempt state negligence or negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims against covered entities. 2 38
Further, HHS regulations implementing HIPAA, such as the Privacy
Rule, may inform the applicable standard of care in certain
circumstance s. 2 39
At least ten other states have also recognized that courts may
look to HIPAA when considering the relevant standard of care for state
negligence claims brought by individuals. 240 Of the state courts that
have addressed this novel approach, only Ohio courts have found
HIPAA neither provides a private right of action nor establishes the

232. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. The Privacy Rule defines "contrary" as impossible to comply with
both state and federal requirements or when "[s]tate law stands as an obstacle" in executing the
Privacy Rule. Id. § 160.202.
233. See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 48 (Conn.
2014); see also infra notes 257-263.
234. 102 A.3d at 48.
235. Id. at 36.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 48.
239. Id.
240. See I.S. v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:11CV235SNLJ, 2011 WL 2433585, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 14,
2011); Harmon v. Maury County, No. 1:05 CV 0026, 2005 WL 2133697, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31,
2005); Fanean v. Rite Aid Corp., 984 A.2d 812, 823 (Del. Super. Ct. 2009); Young v. Carran, 289
S.W.3d 586, 588-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Bonney v. Stephens Mem'1 Hosp., 17 A.3d 123, 128 (Me.
2011); Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 49-50 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Acosta v.
Byrum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 252-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40
N.E.3d 661, 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015); Sorensen v. Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295, 299 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
2006); R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 715, 722-24 (W. Va. 2012).
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standard of care associated with state tort claims. 2 4 1 Nonetheless, it is
clear that a growing number of states are finding covered entities liable
for improper uses and disclosures of PHI. The court decisions from these
states force covered entities to safeguard individuals' PHI and enhance
public trust. 242
IV. LESSONS LEARNED: RETHINKING HUMAN-SUBJECT PROTECTIONS

Despite the Final Rule's promulgation, this Note proposes a
solution to address the same challenges HHS unsuccessfully attempted
to remedy with the new regulation. In doing so, this solution
incorporates lessons learned from both public comments received on the
NPRM and the text of the Privacy Rule, offering a refined regulation
that better balances the interests of human subjects and researchers.
Section IV.A considers alternative forms of consent that promote
autonomy and transparency while reducing administrative burdens.
Section IV.B then establishes rights and remedies to protect human
subjects' interests and identifiable information.
A. Rethinking Consent and Transparency
The Final Rule poses two different methods to obtain consent for
secondary research use of identifiable private information: informed
consent and broad consent. 243 These two alternatives unequally balance
the interests of human subjects and researchers. Informed consent
protects subject autonomy but, even with the Final Rule's streamlined
informed consent documents, increases administrative burdens. Broad
consent, on the other hand, allows data sharing but does not provide
meaningful choice to research subjects. The NPRM comments indicate
the need for efficient and cost-effective research, 244 which does not make
authorization under the Privacy Rule viable. Accordingly, rather than
choosing between informed and broad consent or an authorization, the
Final Rule should require researchers to choose between dynamic or
tiered consent. 245

241. See Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 670 ("The Ohio federal cases ... stand for the undisputed
proposition that Congress did not create a private, statutory right of action to enforce HIPAA's
terms.").
242. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
243. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7220 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
244. For this reason, authorization under the Privacy Rule is likely not a viable option because
of its restrictive nature.
245. See Genetic Alliance Comment, supra note 120 (explaining benefits of dynamic consent).
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Dynamic consent is a personalized, online platform that
facilitates both the consent process and ongoing communication
between researchers and human subjects. 246 This platform allows
human subjects to express how they want information about them used,
to change those choices, and to track and audit any changes. 24 7 Further,
human subjects can choose "when and how they are contacted in cases
in which [recontact] is needed for secondary research purposes." 248
Dynamic consent does not aim to replace human interaction; instead,
the platform seeks to make the process straightforward, interactive,
and ongoing. 249 Human subjects are treated as partners, rather than
one-time contributors. 250
Dynamic consent also benefits researchers. First, the technology
streamlines recruitment and enables efficient recontact. 251 Recruitment
costs in research are high, and "recruitment rates into publicly funded
studies are relatively low." 2 5 2 Dynamic consent platforms can
automatically select human subjects willing to be involved in research;
platforms can also identify, approach, and recruit human subjects for
new studies. 253 Further, when the scope of research changes or data are
sought for secondary research, dynamic consent allows researchers to
easily contact human subjects to make an additional informed

246. Dynamic Consent: A Potential Solution, supra note 182; see Hawys Williams et al.,
Dynamic Consent:A Possible Solution to Improve Patient Confidence and Trust in How Electronic
PatientRecords Are Used in Medical Research, JMIR MED. INFORMATICS, Jan.-Mar. 2015, at 184;'
186 ("The implementation of Dynamic Consent through a convenient computer-based interface
allows for the possibility of using videos, animation, and other formats to increase the
communication to the patients, including the presentation of lay summaries of research results.").
247. Jane Kaye et al., From Patientsto Partners:Participant-Centric
Initiatives in Biomedical
Research, 13 NATURE REVS. GENETIcS 371, 373 (2012).
248. Id.
249. See Isabelle Budin-Ljesne et al., Genome Sequencing in Research Requires a New
Approach to Consent, 135 J. NOR. MED. AsS'N 2031, 2032 (2015) (explaining that dynamic consent
promotes interest in participation and promotes discussion and reflection on research processes).
250. Biobanks in the United Kingdom provide an example of dynamic consent. The Ensuring
Consent and Revocation ("EnCoRe") project is a web-based platform that allows human research
subjects to have an "interactive relationship with the custodians of biobanks and the research
community." ENCORE, http://www.hpl.hp.comlbreweb/encoreproject/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/N2MU-SQCN]. EnCoRe provides real-time feedback to human subjects on how
data are used, and human subjects can provide or revoke consent for further studies. Id.
251. See Jane Kaye et al., Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for Twenty-First Century
Research Networks, 23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 141, 142 (2015) [hereinafter Dynamic Consent]
("Maintaining contact with participants helps researchers to deal with many of the ethical and
legal problems that emerge from unforeseen circumstances.... Dynamic consent makes it easy to
contact participants and to provide readily accessible information so that people can make their
own informed decision.").
252. Id. at 144.
253. See id.
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decision. 254 This platform makes recruitment and communication less
costly, reducing paperwork and staff time.
Next, dynamic consent improves transparency and risk
management at low cost and effort. By contrast, the Final Rule
eliminates some continuing review of research in order to alleviate
similar administrative burdens. 255 With dynamic consent, technology
allows researchers to be continuously apprised of privacy risks human
subjects are willing to take and which data may or may not be used. 256
In doing so, dynamic consent promotes and preserves public trust and
accountability.
Despite its beneficial effects, dynamic consent might be
problematic for human subjects of lower socioeconomic status given its
reliance on technology. As such, tiered consent provides an alternative
to protect human-subject autonomy. Tiered consent is a "consent model
in which participants are given a set of options allowing them to select
how they want to participate in the research." 257 Under this approach,
human subjects might be asked to choose from a list of disease
categories (e.g., cancer or mental illness) or research methodologies
(e.g., genetic analysis or medical record review) at the time of initial
consent. 258 Alternatively, human subjects might be asked to designate
areas of research for which their data may not be used.
Tiered consent is considered by many to be a research best
practice. 259 Arguably, however, this form of consent could become
complicated and administratively burdensome. Still, tiered consent is
no more onerous than informed consent and should be used as an
alternative when dynamic consent is not feasible. Further, studies

254. See id.
255. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7205 (Jan.
19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
256. Dynamic Consent, supra note 251, at 144-45.
257. The

Informed

Consent

Resource,

NAT'L

HUM.

GENOME

RES.

INST.,

(last visited June 21, 2018)
https://www.genome.gov/27559022/informed-consent-glossary/
[https://perma.cc/4S5R-MS9L].
258. Christian M. Simon et al., Active Choice but Not Too Active: Public Perspectives on
Biobank Consent Models, 13 GENETICS MED. 821, 825 (2011).
259. In 2003, the RAND Corporation examined existing human tissue resources and identified
best practices for obtaining consent, among other research protocols. Elisa Eiseman et al., Case
Studies of Existing Human Tissue Repositories, RAND CORP. (2003), https://www.rand.org/
[https://perma.cc/4UJ3-XSYXI.
content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RANDMG12O.pdf
After examining twelve different human tissue repositories, six of which incorporated tiered
consent and one that partially incorporated tiered consent, the RAND Corporation recommended
and identified tiered consent as a best practice (when informed consent is unavailable) to address
privacy, ethical concerns, and consent issues. Id.
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indicate human subjects prefer tiered consent over traditional consent
processes.260
Dynamic consent and tiered consent allow human subjects
greater choice and control over how information about them is used. In
today's data-rich environment, research must be cost effective and
protective, as indicated in the NPRM comments. As such, dynamic
consent and tiered consent provide better options for human subjects
and researchers.
B. EstablishingRights and Remedies
Human subjects must be afforded rights and remedies to protect
their identifiable private information. The Final Rule declines to adopt
much-needed privacy protections and instead continues to allow IRBs
to review protection plans. 261 The Privacy Rule, like HIPAA generally,
provides an existing framework that protects PHI better than the Final
Rule protects identifiable private information. A revised Final Rule
should adopt the HIPAA privacy standards without the requirement for
authorization, which is in line with the comments received on the
NPRM.
The Privacy Rule establishes the general right to authorize use
or disclosure of PHI for research, the right to adequate notice of use and
disclosure of PHI, and the right to an accounting of disclosures of
PHI. 2 62 Many NPRM comments opposed HIPAA standards because
these additional rights increase oversight, costs, and paper trails. 26 3
Accordingly, rather than human subjects authorizing identifiable
private information use, human subjects should consent to research via
dynamic or tiered consent, as discussed previously. Dynamic consent,
specifically, can alleviate the costs and concerns connected with these
forms. 2 6 4 The right to disclosure and accounting, however, must remain

260. In a focus-group session with patients from a genetic epilepsy study, researchers analyzed
perceptions of traditional consent versus tiered consent. Amy L. McGuire et al., DNA Data
Sharing: Research Participants' Perspectives, 10 GENETICS MED. 46, 49-51 (2008). Under
traditional consent, the focus group chose between unrestricted data release or withdrawal, a "take
it or leave it approach." Id. at 49. The focus group unanimously consented to unrestricted data
release, "albeit with some reluctance." Id. at 50. Under a tiered consent approach, the focus group
was given several options, including release to public access or release to a restricted database. Id.
Only one participant agreed to unrestricted data access. Id. The remaining participants consented
to release into a restricted database "in the interest of paranoia for the future." Id.
261. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7202 (Jan. 19,
2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
262. HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.520, 164.528 (2017).
263. For a list of comments opposing the Privacy Rule, see supra note 135.
264. As explained previously, dynamic consent and technology can alleviate administrative
burdens on researchers. See supra Section IV.A.
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to promote trust and transparency. The disclosure and accounting
provisions in the Privacy Rule should be replicated exactly in a revised
Final Rule.
Further, unlike the Final Rule, the Privacy Rule provides
options for corrective action. Under the Privacy Rule, OCR handles
research complaints involving human subjects, and a revised Final Rule
should follow identical procedures. 265 OCR review is proper and
appropriate to protect human subjects because OCR already has the
266
experience addressing research complaints under the Privacy Rule.
OCR review and investigations promote compliance and better protect
human subjects' identifiable private information.
More importantly, the Privacy Rule's novel approach provides
human subjects judicial relief when privacy violations occur. While a
statutory private right of action is ideal to protect human subjects,
recent common law developments under state tort doctrine provide an
alternative antidote to informational harms. 267 As discussed, HIPAA
does not provide a private right of action, yet state courts are
increasingly finding that HIPAA may provide the standard of care in a
negligence action against a covered entity for privacy violations. 268 By
adopting the Privacy Rule, a revised Final Rule would provide human
subjects, for the first time, the opportunity to establish a prima facie
case of negligence for privacy violations. 269 Concurrently, in order for a
revised Final Rule to achieve maximum efficacy, more courts need to
recognize a de facto private right of action under HIPAA. Until a
statutory private right of action appears, a de facto private right of
action provides human subjects the opportunity to have their day in
court.
CONCLUSION

Meaningful research thrives on large amounts of data. Having
more data increases the likelihood of accurate results and accelerates
discoveries. In the process of data collection, however, human subjects'
interests must be considered.
Today's data-rich environment increasingly exposes human
subjects to informational harms. The Final Rule, enacted to protect
human subjects, prioritizes the interests of researchers over the

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See
See
See
See
See

What to Expect, supra note 228.
id.
supra note 241 and accompanying text.
supra note 241 and accompanying text.
supra note 231 (explaining the elements of a prima facie case of negligence).
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interests of human subjects. The Final Rule's changes to human-subject
protections-reducing IRB oversight, failing to adopt privacy
standards, and approving broad consent for secondary research-do not
favor human subjects. Rather, they principally alleviate researchers'
administrative burdens and costs.
Success in research is contingent on trust. When trust fails,
research comes to a halt. To uphold and foster trusting relationships,
human subjects must be treated as partners in research. As such, the
Final Rule must be transformed into a protective regulation that affords
human subjects certain rights, remedies, and control over how
information about them is used. Human subjects must be offered
meaningful choices when consenting to studies. Further, human
subjects must have rights and remedies throughout the entire research
process in case privacy violations occur. Regulators and researchers
need to revisit the official title of the Final Rule: Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects.
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